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THE NEED FOR A FORMIDABLE PRIVATE 
RIGHT OF ACTION IN THE MUTUAL FUND 
CONTEXT: AN ANALYSIS OF JANUS’ 
CATEGORICAL LIMITATION ON PRIMARY 
LIABILITY UNDER RULE 10B-5 
INTRODUCTION 
Mutual funds are a dominating force in the American economy. At the 
end of 2009, the mutual fund industry held assets worth more than $11 
trillion and comprised approximately one-fifth of America’s household 
financial assets and retirement savings.1 These numbers are only expected 
to grow.2 From soccer moms to CEOs, the investors in mutual funds range 
from all socioeconomic backgrounds. These investors choose a particular 
mutual fund, not because of the mutual fund—the fund itself is merely a 
shell corporation—but because they trust the investment adviser managing 
the fund.3 Investors willingly risk their personal earnings because they trust 
no fraud is occurring; and they presume that even if fraud did occur, they 
would be able to hold the proper fraudulent parties liable. 
Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders (Janus),4 
however, is the latest in a series of U.S. Supreme Court decisions that erode 
the scope of civil liability under § 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act 
of 19345 and Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Rule 10b-5.6 In 
holding that only the person or entity with “ultimate authority” can be held 
liable in a private right of action under Rule 10b-5,7 the Court frustrates the 
statutory intent of the Exchange Act. The Exchange Act was designed to 
protect the integrity of the markets, provide investor confidence, and 
compensate victims by limiting private causes of action for fraud or 
misrepresentation.8 Janus continues the pattern in Central Bank of Denver 
                                                                                                                 
 1. See John Morley & Quinn Curtis, Taking Exit Rights Seriously: Why Governance and Fee 
Litigation Don’t Work in Mutual Funds, 120 YALE L.J. 84, 87 (2010); see also INV. CO. INST., 
2010 INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK (50th ed. 2010), available at http://www.ici.org/pdf 
/2010_factbook.pdf. 
 2. See Amy Y. Yeung & Kristen J. Freeman, Gartenberg, Jones, and the Meaning of 
Fiduciary: A Legislative Investigation of Section 36(b), 35 DEL. J. CORP. L. 483, 48384 (2010) 
(noting that “[w]ith the liquidity of redeemable shares and the potential for higher yields with 
comparatively low monitoring costs, the allure of mutual fund investment has undeniably caught 
the eye—and wallets—of investors”). 
 3. “Trust . . . is the cornerstone of effectively functioning markets.” Mutual Funds: Trading 
Practices and Abuses that Harm Investors, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Fin. Mgmt, the 
Budget, and Int’l Sec. of the S. Comm. on Gov’t Affairs, 108th Cong. 5 (2004) (opening statement 
of Sen. Akaka), available at http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/senate/pdf/108hrg/91038.pdf. 
 4. Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296 (2011). 
 5. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2000). 
 6. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5. 
 7. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2302. 
 8. Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 175 (2008) 
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (“A theme that underlies the Court’s analysis is its mistaken hostility 
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v. First Interstate Bank of Denver (Central Bank)9 and Stoneridge 
Investment Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc. (Stoneridge)10 of 
insulating culpable corporate actors from private action liability when they 
did not directly participate in the sale of securities. In Janus, the Court went 
even further in its limitation by narrowly defining who can “make” a 
fraudulent statement and allowed corporate formalities to shield fraudulent 
mutual fund advisers from being held liable to deceived investors.11 The 
Court’s strict adherence to corporate formalities is incongruous with the 
intent of the Exchange Act and ignores the way a mutual fund corporation 
is actually run. When a mutual fund makes a statement, investors 
reasonably “attribute” these statements to the fund adviser, despite the 
advisers being separate legal entities from the mutual funds.12 Limiting an 
investor’s right to recover from culpable parties will inevitably erode 
investor confidence in mutual fund investments. 
The Janus majority states, “Any reapportionment of liability . . . in light 
of the close relationship between investment advisers and mutual funds is 
properly the responsibility of Congress and not the courts.”13 Thus, the 
Court recognizes the unique situation in the mutual fund context but punts 
on the issue, choosing instead to safely rely upon arguably unsound 
precedent. In this note, I argue that the Janus Court erred in deciding that 
only those that have “ultimate authority” can “make” fraudulent statements 
and be held primarily liable under Rule 10b-5. It is now the responsibility 
of Congress to amend the Exchange Act to expand primary liability in the 
mutual fund context to prevent fraudulent actors from hiding behind 
corporate formalities. As our financial markets struggle to recover from a 
near collapse, a formidable private right of action for defrauded investors is 
pivotal in restoring trust in our markets and increasing economic 
efficiency.14 By expressly expanding liability to mutual fund investment 
                                                                                                                 
towards the § 10(b) private cause of action.”); see S. Rep. No. 73-792, at 12 (1934) (noting that in 
regards to the Exchange Act, “if an investor has suffered loss by reason of illicit practices, it is 
equitable that he should be allowed to recover damages from the guilty party”). 
 9. Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164 (1994). 
 10. Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148 (2008). 
 11. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2302, 2304.  
 12. See Floyd Norris, A Novel Way to Sidestep Investor Suits, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 2010, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/03/business/03norris.html. 
One of the great legal fictions of Wall Street is that mutual funds are independent of the 
companies that create and run them . . . . In the real world, the fact that Janus controls 
the funds it runs is so obvious as to hardly merit a mention, any more than one would 
emphasize that General Motors or General Electric control their subsidiaries. 
Id.  
 13. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2304.  
 14. See KENNETH R. GRAY ET AL., CORPORATE SCANDALS: THE MANY FACES OF GREED 3 
(1st ed. 2005). 
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advisers, defrauded investors will be properly recompensed and egregious 
fraudulent actors will be held culpable for their actions. 
This note explores the Court’s categorical limitation of an investors’ 
ability to seek a private right of action under Rule 10b-5 when the investor 
has relied upon misstatements from a mutual fund, but the statements are 
reasonably attributable to a separate legal entity—the mutual fund adviser. 
Part I describes the unique relationship between mutual funds and their 
advisers. This note then briefly introduces the private right of action 
doctrine and summarizes the securities laws prior to Janus. Finally, the 
facts of Janus are presented, followed by both the Janus majority and 
dissent’s reasoning. Part II argues that the Janus holding conflicts with 
dicta in previous Supreme Court cases and well-reasoned lower court 
determinations. Part III argues that the Supreme Court shortsightedly 
refuses to acknowledge the uniquely close relationship between mutual 
funds and their advisers, essentially adhering to form over substance. 
Mutual fund advisers exhibit de facto control of the funds. Due to this 
domination, the Court undermines the legislative intent of § 10(b) by 
refusing to allow investors to pierce the corporate veil and by letting fund 
advisers insulate themselves via the corporate form. Finally, Part IV 
maintains that the Janus holding will inevitably lead to market inefficiency 
because it creates a moral hazard problem for mutual fund advisers. In order 
to foster market integrity, Congress must expressly provide a formidable 
private right of action to defrauded investors. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. MUTUAL FUND STRUCTURE 
“A mutual fund is a type of investment company that pools money from 
many investors [shareholders] and invests [their] money in [a diversified 
portfolio of] stocks, bonds, money-market instruments, and other 
securities.”15 Mutual funds “issue[] only redeemable common stock, [are] 
sold widely to the public,16 and [are] composed almost entirely of debt or 
minority equity holdings in many companies.”17 Mutual funds are popular 
because they provide small investors18 professional management and 
                                                                                                                 
 15. Mutual Funds, SEC.GOV, http://www.sec.gov/answers/mutfund.htm (last visited Oct. 31, 
2011). 
 16. Morley & Curtis, supra note 1, at 92. In order to sell shares widely to the public, mutual 
funds must register with the SEC and provide disclosure to investors at the time of initial sale and 
on a periodic basis. Jill E. Fisch, Rethinking the Regulation of Securities Intermediaries, 158 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1961, 1968 (2010). 
 17. Morley & Curtis, supra note 1, at 92.  
 18. Small investors may be characterized as “financially unsophisticated and of limited 
means.” Fisch, supra note 16, at 1964.  
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convenience while diversifying their holdings and reducing risk.19 
Consequently, mutual funds have become a dominant form of investment. 
Even after the market collapse of 2008, “the mutual fund industry held 
assets worth more than $11 trillion and comprised approximately one-fifth 
of America’s household financial assets and retirement savings.”20 
While mutual funds are independent legal entities owned by 
shareholders with voting rights and governed by a board of directors, their 
external management structure makes them uniquely different from other 
typical corporations.21 “[C]ommentators have described mutual funds as 
‘captive shell[s],’ ‘spartan business organizations,’ and ‘rudimentary legal 
vessel[s]’ because, unlike typical corporations, mutual funds are externally 
managed.”22 The funds themselves have “no offices, no equipment, and no 
employees,” and “third parties perform all of the functions that the fund 
must perform to increase value.”23 
Although the mutual fund and its professional financial managers 
(advisers) are separate legal entities, the advisers are responsible for 
running the mutual funds’ day-to-day operations.24 Technically, the funds 
contract with the advisers for management services, and the adviser then 
selects and employs individual portfolio managers.25 Practically, however, 
“mutual funds do not hire investment advisers; rather, funds are typically 
organized by their advisers, and their boards of directors are initially 
selected by the advisers.”26 The investment advisers “charge a percentage 
fee to their advisee funds for management services rendered.”27 These fees 
are derived from the number of assets under the adviser’s management, and 
are paid regardless of good performance or bad performance by the 
advisers.28 Since the fee amount is not contingent upon performance, an 
                                                                                                                 
 19. Emily D. Johnson, The Fiduciary Duty in Mutual Fund Excessive Fee Cases: Ripe for 
Reexamination, 59 DUKE L.J. 145, 151 (2009). 
 20. Morley & Curtis, supra note 1, at 87; see INV. CO. INST., 2010 INVESTMENT COMPANY 
FACT BOOK 22 (50th ed. 2010), available at http://www.ici.org/pdf/2010_factbook.pdf. 
 21. See Fisch, supra note 16, at 2010−15 (“Although mutual fund directors can, in theory, 
terminate the advisory contract [with the mutual fund adviser] . . . such a decision is of little 
practical value because it effectively terminates the fund.”).  
 22. Johnson, supra note 19, at 151 (citations omitted).  
 23. Id. (citation omitted).  
 24. Morley & Curtis, supra note 1, at 92. Typical day-to-day management duties include 
researching “which securities to buy and sell[,] . . . portfolio management[,] . . . . procuring office 
space and overseeing administrative staff.” Johnson, supra at note 19, at 152.  
 25. Morley & Curtis, supra note 1, at 92.  
 26. Id. “The investment advisor is often the fund’s initial sponsor and initial shareholder . . . 
[and] [t]he close nexus between the investment advisor and the fund remains over time because 
after the advisor ‘gives birth to the fund . . . the umbilical cord is never cut.’” Johnson, supra note 
19, at 152. 
 27. Samuel S. Kim, Mutual Funds: Solving the Shortcomings of the Independent Director 
Response to Advisory Self-Dealing Through Use of the Undue Influence Standard, 98 COLUM. L. 
REV. 474, 480 (1998). 
 28. Johnson, supra note 19, at 155. 
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investment adviser has a strong incentive to increase the number of 
investors by attracting new investors through promotion.29 
As with any corporate board, the board of a mutual fund has a fiduciary 
duty to serve the interests of its shareholders.30 The mutual fund, however, 
is merely a pool of assets without the adviser’s operational elements.31 
Although the board can theoretically terminate the adviser’s contract, such a 
decision has little value because it effectively terminates the fund.32 The 
“absence of an effective mechanism for influencing the advisor’s behavior 
imposes a critical limit on a director’s ability to act as an effective 
fiduciary.”33 In formation, the adviser appoints officers, affiliated directors, 
and unaffiliated independent directors to serve on the board.34 In 
comparison, the shareholders typically elect a normal corporate board. In 
terms of responsibilities, “[m]utual fund boards are much less involved in 
strategy than are ordinary company boards . . . spending the overwhelming 
majority of their time on compliance matters rather than on investing 
strategy.”35 
B. BRIEF HISTORY OF SECURITIES LAWS AND RECENT SUPREME 
COURT DECISIONS 
1. Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and 
SEC Rule 10b-5 
The high prevalence of securities fraud was a major contributing cause 
of the 1929 economic crash and resulting depression.36 Thus, the 73rd 
Congress passed the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934 (the Exchange Act) in order to restore investor confidence by 
limiting fraud in the securities market.37 A Senate Report explained: 
The purpose of this bill is to protect the investing public . . . . The aim is to 
prevent further exploitation of the public by the sale of unsound, 
                                                                                                                 
 29. Id. Advisers are not responsible for promotional fees. Rather, the current investors of the 
fund must bear these costs. Id. (citation omitted).  
 30. Id. at 152. 
 31. Fisch, supra note 16, at 2011.  
 32. Id.  
 33. Id. at 2011–12.  
 34. Johnson, supra note 19, at 152–53. Section 10(a) of the Investment Company Act of 1940 
stated that at least 40 percent of each board’s members must be independent. See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-
10(a) (2006). Currently, a majority of the board must be independent. Role of Independent 
Directors of Investment Companies, 66 Fed. Reg. 3734, 3736 (Jan. 16, 2001) (to be codified at 17 
C.F.R. pts. 239, 240, 270, 274). 
 35. Morley & Curtis, supra note 1, at 95.  
 36. Gary J. Aguirre, The Enron Decision: Closing the Fraud-Free Zone on Errant 
Gatekeepers?, 28 DEL. J. CORP. L. 447, 460 (2003). 
 37. Id.; see also Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 
164, 171 (1994) (“The 1933 Act regulates initial distributions of securities, and the 1934 Act for 
the most part regulates post-distribution trading.”). 
708 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. [Vol. 6 
fraudulent, and worthless securities through misrepresentation; to place 
adequate and true information before the investor; . . . to restore the 
confidence of the prospective investor in his ability to select sound 
securities; to bring into productive channels of industry and development 
capital which has grown timid to the point of hoarding; and to aid in 
providing employment and restoring buying and consuming power.38 
Thus, eight underlying policies supported the creation of § 10(b) and 
Rule 10b-5: “(1) maintaining free securities markets; (2) equalizing access 
to information; (3) insuring equal bargaining strength; (4) providing for 
disclosure; (5) protecting investors; (6) assuring fairness; (7) building 
investor confidence; and (8) deterring violations while compensating 
victims.”39 
Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act prohibits fraud in connection with 
the purchase or sale of securities.40 Under § 10(b), it is unlawful for any 
person to “use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any 
security . . . any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in 
contravention of such rules and regulations as the [SEC] may prescribe as 
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of 
investors.”41 
Rule 10b-5, promulgated by the SEC under the rulemaking authority 
granted to it by Congress in § 10(b), provides that “it is unlawful for ‘any 
person, directly or indirectly, . . . [t]o make any untrue statement of material 
fact’ in connection with the purchase or sale of securities.”42 To state a 
claim for relief under Rule 10b-5, a plaintiff must allege that “in connection 
with the purchase or sale of securities, the defendant, acting with scienter, 
made a false material representation or omitted to disclose material 
information and that plaintiff’s reliance on defendant’s action caused 
[plaintiff] injury.”43 Thus, a successful claim for securities fraud requires 
five elements: “(1) scienter,44 (2) materiality,45 (3) loss causation,46 (4) 
                                                                                                                 
 38. Aguirre, supra note 36, at 460 (citing S. REP NO. 73−47, at 1 (1933)).  
 39. ARNOLD S. JACOBS, 5B DISCLOSURE AND REMEDIES UNDER THE SECURITIES LAWS § 6:4 
(West 2011). 
 40. 15 U.S.C. § 78(j) (2010). 
 41. Id. 
 42. Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2301 (2011) 
(emphasis added) (citing 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b)). 
 43. Press v. Chem. Inv. Servs. Corp., 166 F.3d 529, 534 (2d Cir. 1999). 
 44. The scienter needed to state a claim is the “intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud.” 
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 194 (1976). 
 45. A fact is material “if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would 
consider it important [in making a voting decision].” Elizabeth A. Nowicki, 10(b) or Not 10(b)?: 
Yanking the Security Blanket for Attorneys in Securities Litigation, 2004 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 
637, 643 (2004). 
 46. “To establish loss causation under Section 10(b), plaintiffs ‘must allege that they would 
not have suffered a loss on their investment if the facts were as they believed them to be at the 
time they purchased the securities.’” Id. at 645 (citing In re VMS Sec. Litig., 752 F. Supp. 1373, 
1399 (N.D. Ill. 1990)).  
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[reliance],47 and (5) that the fraud occurred ‘in connection with the purchase 
or sale of securities.’”48 
2. Implied Private Right of Action 
When a person is injured by a violation of Rule 10b-5, he can sue to 
enforce his rights.49 This is a fundamental aspect in upholding securities 
laws. While breaches of Rule 10b-5 can result in criminal penalties or 
sanctions and fines by the SEC, these remedies alone cannot efficiently 
regulate Rule 10b-5 infractions.50 Criminal sanctions for each infraction 
would chill the financial markets and “stifle the raising of capital[,]” while 
budgetary and staffing constraints limit the SEC’s ability to police all Rule 
10b-5 breaches.51 Thus, the main source of enforcement for Rule 10b-5 
violations is the ability of the defrauded investor to recover his losses. 
Yet, § 10(b) of the Exchange Act does not expressly confer a private 
right of action for its violation. Despite being a recognized and much 
discussed doctrine today, an implied right of action under § 10(b) and Rule 
10b-5 was not initially acknowledged by the courts.52 It was not until 1971, 
in Superintendent of Insurance of New York v. Bankers Life & Casualty 
Co.,53 that the Court found an implied right of action under the provisions 
of the federal securities law.54 The Court, however, “abruptly reversed a 
forty-year trend of federal decisions liberally construing the antifraud 
provisions to protect investors”55 with the triumvirate of narrow holdings: 
Central Bank, Stoneridge, and now, Janus. 
                                                                                                                 
 47. “[T]he damage complained of [must] be one of the foreseeable consequences of the 
misrepresentation.” Id. (citing AUSA Life Ins. Co. v. Ernst & Young, 206 F.3d 202, 216 (2d Cir. 
2000)). 
 48. Id. at 642.  
 49. JACOBS, supra note 39, § 6:14.  
 50. Id.; see S. REP. NO. 73-792, at 12 (1934) (stating criminal penalties as the sole sanction are 
inadequate because customers are usually reluctant to report such fraud and without such reports, 
identification of fraud is extremely difficult).  
 51. JACOBS, supra note 39, § 6:14.  
 52. See Alan S. Ritchie, The Proposed “Securities Private Enforcement Reform Act”: The 
Introduction of Proportionate Liability into Rule 10b-5 Litigation, 42 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 339, 344 
(1994). 
 53. Superintendent of Ins. of N.Y. v. Bankers Life and Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971) 
(finding “[s]ection 10(b) must be read flexibly, not technically and restrictively”). 
 54. See E. Thomas Sullivan & Robert B. Thompson, The Supreme Court and Private Law: 
The Vanishing Importance of Securities and Antitrust, 53 EMORY L.J. 1571, 1580–81 (2004). 
 55. Aguirre, supra note 36, at 452; see, e.g., Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 
U.S. 723 (1975) (finding that plaintiff must be a purchaser or seller); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 
425 U.S. 185 (1976) (finding that defendant must have acted with scienter); Santa Fe Industries, 
Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977) (finding that defendant must have acted deceptively); Cent. 
Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164 (1994) (denying 
liability for aiders and abettors); Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336 (2005) 
(imposing a strict loss-causation requirement); Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-
Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148 (2008) (holding that defendant must have made a misleading statement 
that was relied upon by plaintiffs). 
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Relying on Central Bank and Stoneridge to justify its holding, the 
Janus Court promulgated its new rule that only entities with “ultimate 
authority” can “make” a statement. A “broader reading of ‘make’ . . . would 
[have] substantially undermine[d] Central Bank.”56 The Court’s analysis 
pertaining to these two cases is worth further scrutiny. 
3. Central Bank of Denver 
Central Bank involved a bond issuer accused of making materially false 
statements, a defendant bank serving as an indenture trustee who was 
supposed to check the bond issuer’s valuations, and a plaintiff claiming the 
bank delayed its valuation checks and thus helped the issuer make its false 
statements credible.57 The legal issue was one of secondary liability. 
Specifically, “whether private civil liability under § 10(b) extends . . . to 
[the bank] who d[id] not engage in the manipulative or deceptive practice, 
but who aid[ed] and abet[ted] the [bond issuer’s] violation.”58 The Court 
held that an aider and abettor of another person who violates Rule 10b-5 
cannot be held liable in a private suit.59 
4. Stoneridge 
After Central Bank, the lower courts differed on how to differentiate 
between a primary violator and an aider and abettor, who could not be liable 
under Rule 10b-5.60 Stoneridge resolved this problem. Scientific-Atlanta 
(Scientific), a supplier of electronic equipment, entered into a series of 
fraudulent sales and purchase agreements with Charter, a cable television 
company.61 Charter purchased Scientific’s cable boxes for $20 more than 
market price, and, in return, Scientific purchased more advertisements from 
Charter with additional capital.62 Scientific and Charter then exchanged 
letters and backdated contracts indicating Scientific had raised the price for 
cable boxes by $20 for all customers for that particular year.63 This 
arrangement enabled Charter to mislead its accountants and the public into 
                                                                                                                 
 56. Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 230204 (2011). 
 57. Cent. Bank, 511 U.S. at 168.  
 58. Id. at 166.  
 59. Id. at 177 (“[T]he text of the 1934 Act does not itself reach those who aid and abet a  
§ 10(b) violation . . . . It is inconsistent . . . to extend liability beyond the scope of conduct 
prohibited by the statutory text.”).  
 60. Compare, e.g., Simpson v. AOL Time Warner Inc. 452 F.3d 1040, 1048 (9th Cir. 2006) 
(holding that “substantial participation or intricate involvement” was sufficient to hold defendants 
primarily liable under Rule 10b-5 liability), with Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Credit Suisse First 
Boston (USA), Inc., 482 F.3d 372, 390 (5th Cir. 2007) (finding that substantial participation was 
not sufficient to be primarily liable). 
 61. Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 153 (2008). 
 62. Id. at 154.  
 63. Id.  
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believing Charter had more revenue than it actually had.64 Investors sued 
Charter, seeking to include Scientific, under Rule 10b-5.65 
The Stoneridge Court held that a person who intentionally participates 
with another in a fraudulent scheme by creating false documents cannot be 
held liable as a primary violator unless that person actually makes a 
misstatement on which the plaintiff relies.66 Thus, Scientific was absolved 
from liability. Despite Scientific knowing its false contracts and letters 
would be used to mislead the public, the public was not able to see the 
actual false documents themselves, and thus there was insufficient reliance 
to support a private right of action.67 
C. THE FACTS OF JANUS 
In this class action, First Derivative Traders (First Derivative), the lead 
plaintiff, represented shareholders of Janus Capital Group (JCG).68 JCG 
was the publicly traded parent company of Janus Capital Management 
(JCM), who was the investment adviser, underwriter and administrator of 
Janus Investment Fund (JIF), a mutual fund.69 “Although JCG created [JIF], 
[JIF was] a separate legal entity . . . . [and] ha[d] no assets apart from those 
owned by the investors.”70 Thus, there were three separate legal entities in 
JCG, JCM, and JIF. 
As mandated by the securities laws, “[JIF] issued prospectuses 
describing the investment strategy and operations of its mutual funds to 
investors.”71 These prospectuses indicated that the mutual funds were “not 
suitable for market timing72 and . . . that JCM would implement policies to 
curb the practice.”73 Yet, in 2003, the Attorney General of the State of New 
York filed a complaint against JCG and JCM alleging that JCG secretly cut 
deals with some hedge funds to permit market timing in funds run by 
JCM.74 After these allegations became public, investors withdrew large 
amounts of money from JIF. Since “[JIF] compensated JCM based on the 
total value of the funds and JCM’s management fees comprised a 
                                                                                                                 
 64. Id. at 154–55. 
 65. Id. at 155.  
 66. Id. at 16667.  
 67. Id. at 167.  
 68. Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2300 (2011). 
 69. Id. at 2299. 
 70. Id.  
 71. Id. at 2300.  
 72. Although not illegal, market timing is “an investment strategy by which sophisticated 
short-term traders take advantage of delays in the pricing of mutual funds, to the detriment of 
other fund investors.” Norman S. Poser, The Supreme Court’s Janus Capital Case, 44 REV. OF 
SEC. & COMMODITIES REG. 205, 205 (2011). 
 73. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2300 (footnote added). 
 74. In 2004, JCG and JCM settled these allegations with the SEC and paid $100 million in 
penalties. Id. at 2300 n.2.  
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significant percentage of JCG’s income, JIF’s loss of value affected JCG’s 
value as well.”75 
First Derivative asserted that JCM “caused mutual fund prospectuses to 
be issued for Janus mutual funds and made them available to the investing 
public, which created the misleading impression that [JCG and JCM] would 
implement measures to curb market timing in the Janus [mutual funds].”76 
Furthermore, First Derivative purported that, “had the truth been known, 
[JIF] would have been less attractive to investors, and consequently [JCG] 
would have realized lower revenues, so [JCG’s] stock would have traded at 
lower prices.”77 
While the relationship between JIF and JCM would be unusual in most 
business structures, it is typical for a mutual fund.78 JIF was a mere shell 
company with no employees or assets.79 It was created, managed, and 
administered by JCM, and all of JIF’s seventeen officers were vice-
presidents at JCM.80 Most notably, JCM drafted and reviewed JIF’s 
prospectuses, including language pertaining to “market timing.”81 Yet, the 
Court found that the facts showed JCM could not “make” fraudulent 
statements because JIF’s board of directors had “ultimate authority.”82 
D. THE JANUS DECISION AND ANALYSIS 
1. The Majority Opinion 
The Court held that “[f]or purposes of Rule 10b-5, the maker of a 
statement is the person or entity with ultimate authority over the statement, 
including its content and whether and how to communicate it.”83 The Court 
explained that “[w]ithout control, a person or entity can merely suggest 
what to say, not ‘make’ a statement in its own right. One who prepares or 
publishes a statement on behalf of another is not its maker.”84 The Court, 
analogizing JCM and JIF’s relationship to one between a speechwriter and a 
speaker, stated that “[e]ven when a speechwriter drafts a speech, the content 
is entirely within the control of the person who delivers it. And it is the 
                                                                                                                 
 75. Id. at 2300 (“JCG’s stock price fell nearly 25 percent, from $17.68 on September 2 to 
$13.50 on September 26.”).  
 76. Id. (alterations in original) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 77. Id. 
 78. “A [mutual] fund rarely employs its own officers and staff. Instead, an external investment 
adviser sponsors the fund and provides for its day-to-day management. In exchange . . . the 
adviser earns a percentage of fund assets.” Kristen J. Freeman & Amy Y. Yeung, Jones v. Harris: 
A Fresh Approach to the Gartenberg Standard, 35 DEL. J. CORP. L. 959, 962 (2010). 
 79. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2299. 
 80. Id.  
 81. Id. at 2300–01.  
 82. Id. at 2302. 
 83. Id. (emphasis added).  
 84. Id. 
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speaker who takes credit—or blame—for what is ultimately said.”85 In other 
words, even though JCM actually prepared and drafted the misrepresented 
prospectuses, because it was done on behalf of the shell entity, JIF, JCM 
was not liable to the victims of the fraud. The Court never expressed how it 
determined the bright-line definition of “make” to require “ultimate 
authority.” 
The Court reasoned that its holding flows from Central Bank, where 
Rule 10b-5’s scope of civil liability did not include aiders and abettors.86 
According to the majority, if a broader reading of “make” were 
incorporated,87 then “aiders and abettors would be almost nonexistent,” 
undermining Central Bank’s holding.88 From this reasoning, it is evident 
that the Court is determined to maintain a distinction between primary and 
secondary liability, where a private right of action is not permitted for the 
latter situation.89 This concern, however, seems ill-placed with respect to 
Janus. In Janus, the issue was seemingly one of primary liability as 
opposed to secondary liability. JCM was not a mere peripheral actor, as in 
Central Bank, but the drafter and distributor of JIF’s prospectuses.90 
The majority draws further support for its holding from Stoneridge. 
According to Stoneridge, if a deception is undisclosed to the public, it could 
not have been relied upon by the public, despite an entity agreeing to 
knowingly participate in a fraud on the market.91 Thus, the Stoneridge 
Court concluded that “nothing [the entity] did made it unnecessary or 
inevitable for [the company] to record the transactions as it did.”92 Janus 
took this one step further by “absolv[ing] the drafter of false documents that 
were intended to—and did—reach the public directly.”93 Since JCM did not 
have ultimate authority, “it [was] not ‘necessary or inevitable’ that any 
falsehood [would] be contained in the statement.”94 Further, the Janus 
Court saw no reason to differentiate between engaging in deceptive 
transactions (as in Stoneridge) and participating in the drafting of a false 
statement (as in Janus) because “each is merely an undisclosed act 
                                                                                                                 
 85. Id.  
 86. Id.  
 87. The Court construed a “broader reading of ‘make’” to include “persons or entities without 
control over the content of a statement” but still “considered primary violators who ‘made’ the 
statement.” Id.  
 88. Id. The majority did note that the SEC is still able to bring suit against aiders and abettors 
pursuant to 15 U.S.C.A. § 78t(e). Id.  
 89. Id. at 2302 n.6 (“[F]or Central Bank to have any meaning, there must be some distinction 
between those who are primarily liable (and thus may be pursued in private suits) and those who 
are secondarily liable (and thus may not be pursued in private suits).”).  
 90. Id. at 2312 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  
 91. Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 16667 (2008). 
 92. Id. at 161.  
 93. Poser, supra note 72, at 206.  
 94. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2303.  
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preceding the decision of an independent entity to make a public 
statement.”95 
Finally, the majority declined to recognize the “uniquely close 
relationship between a mutual fund and its investment advisor,” rigidly 
adhering to the corporate form.96 First Derivative argued that, unlike a 
typical secondary actor such “as a lawyer, accountant, or bank,”97 in light of 
mutual-fund-industry practice an investment adviser almost always controls 
the fund like “a playwright whose lines are delivered by an actor.”98 Despite 
recognizing the significant control of a mutual fund adviser over its funds, 
the majority refused to disregard the corporate form.99 
The majority noted that since private rights of action under Rule 10b-5 
were implied by the courts, the scope of liability should not be expanded.100 
Whether a contrary decision in Janus would have necessarily expanded the 
scope of Rule 10b-5 is not sufficiently evident though.101 What is evident, 
however, is that the Court’s adoption of a new bright-line rule of “ultimate 
authority” narrows the scope of liability beyond what has been previously 
established. 
2. The Dissenting Opinion 
The dissenting opinion102 took issue with the majority’s interpretation 
of the word “make.”103 The dissent argued that neither common English nor 
prior precedent supported the notion that only those with “ultimate 
authority” may be liable under Rule 10b-5, stating that “depending on the 
circumstances, a management company, a board of trustees, individual 
company officers, or others, separately or together, might ‘make’ statements 
contained in a firm’s prospectus—even if a board of directors has ultimate 
content-related responsibility.”104 The dissent concluded that, given the 
particular facts, JCM should be held liable under a private right of action.105 
First, the dissent explained that the “English language does not impose 
upon the word ‘make’ boundaries of the kind the majority finds 
determinative.”106 The dissent listed several examples: cabinet officials 
often make statements about items that the Constitution places within the 
                                                                                                                 
 95. Id.  
 96. Id. at 2304.  
 97. Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 191 
(1994). 
 98. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2304.  
 99. It is undisputed that all corporate formalities were observed by JCM and JIF. Id. 
 100. Id. at 2303.  
 101. Poser, supra note 72, at 206.  
 102. The dissent was written by Justice Breyer, with whom Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and 
Kagan joined. See Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2305.  
 103. Id. at 2306 (Breyer J., dissenting).  
 104. Id.  
 105. Id.  
 106. Id. at 2307.  
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ultimate authority of the President; corporate officials make statements 
about the company where the board of directors has ultimate authority; and 
generally, employees make statements “that, as to content, form, or timing, 
are subject to the control of another.”107 As a result, the dissent reasoned 
that “[n]othing in the English language prevents one from saying that 
several different individuals, separately or together, ‘make’ a statement that 
each has a hand in producing.”108 The dissent concluded, “[p]ractical 
matters related to context, including control, participation, and relevant 
audience, help determine who ‘makes’ a statement and to whom that 
statement may properly be ‘attributed’ . . . .”109 
Next, the dissent examined prior precedent, namely Stoneridge and 
Central Bank, and refuted the majority’s assertion that either case supported 
its holding. The dissent argued that Central Bank was different from Janus 
because it pertained to “secondary liability, liability attaching, not to an 
individual making a false statement, but to an individual helping someone 
else do so.”110 The dissent further noted that Central Bank held that “any 
person or entity, including a lawyer, accountant, or bank, who employs a 
manipulative device or makes a material misstatement . . . may be liable as 
a primary violator under 10b-5, assuming all of the requirements for 
primary liability . . . are met.”111 Thus, the dissent maintained that the 
majority’s holding did not follow Central Bank. Instead, it undermined 
Central Bank by extending its holding “into new territory that Central Bank 
explicitly placed outside that holding.”112 As for Stoneridge, the dissent 
pointed out that Stoneridge’s holding was based upon whether the investors 
could prove sufficient reliance on fraudulent misstatements.113 No one in 
Stoneridge argued that the fraudulent equipment suppliers were the makers 
of the cable company’s misstatement, and thus that case adds little support 
or relevance to the majority’s holding.114 
Finally, the dissent surmised that in these particular circumstances, 
JCM should be held liable for “making” fraudulent statements.115 The 
dissent stressed that “[t]he relationship between [JCM] and [JIF] could 
hardly have been closer” and that JCM’s “involvement in preparing and 
writing the relevant statements could hardly have been greater.”116 
                                                                                                                 
 107. Id.  
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. (citation omitted).  
 110. Id. (emphasis in original).  
 111. Id. at 2308 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate 
Bank of Denver, N.A. 511 U.S. 164, 191 (1994)).  
 112. Id.  
 113. Id. at 2309 (citing Stoneridge Inv. Partners LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc. 552 U.S. 148, 
159 (2008)).  
 114. Id.  
 115. Id.  
 116. Id. at 2312. 
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Distinguishing prior precedent upon which the majority relied and noting 
that lower courts have oft-held “that at least sometimes corporate officials 
and others can be held liable under Rule 10b-5 for having ‘ma[d]e’ a 
materially false statement even when that statement appears in a document 
(or is made by a third person) that the officials do not legally control[,]”117 
the dissent concluded that a proper holding should have permitted a private 
right of action against JCM.118 
II. THE JANUS RULING IS INCONSISTENT WITH REASONING 
FROM PRIOR CASES AND CIRCUIT DECISIONS 
As the dissent properly notes, the Supreme Court and several U.S. 
circuit courts of appeals had previously imposed primary liability on 
individuals or entities who draft, edit, and review financial reports and other 
documents that ultimately reach investors or impact securities markets.119 
Although dicta, the Central Bank Court explained that a “lawyer, 
accountant, or bank, who . . . makes a material misstatement (or omission) 
on which a purchaser or seller of securities relies, may be liable as a 
primary violator under 10b-5.”120 Thus, while the defendants in Central 
Bank did not commit a manipulative or deceptive act within the meaning of 
§ 10(b), the Court did not categorically prohibit primary liability from being 
found in separate entities.121 
In Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, plaintiff investors sued, among 
other defendants who had participated in the fraudulent offering document, 
the accounting firm Herman & MacLean, which had issued an opinion 
concerning financial statements that were included in the prospectus and 
registration statement.122 The Court noted that Herman & MacLean could 
be held primarily liable under § 10(b) for preparing the fraudulent 
registration statement, even if there was no specific attribution to the 
accounting firm, because “Section 10(b) extends to ‘any person’ who 
engages in fraud in connection with a purchase or sale of securities.”123 
Curiously, the Janus court seems to completely ignore this decision. Similar 
to the facts in Herman & MacLean, JCM participated in the drafting of the 
statements. While there is no specific attribution in a mutual fund context, it 
                                                                                                                 
 117. Id. at 2311 (emphasis in original).  
 118. Id. at 2312. The dissent noted, in Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, that certain 
individuals who contribute to the preparation of the registration statement, “including corporate 
officers, lawyers, and accountants, may be primarily liable even where ‘they are not named as 
having prepared or certified’ the registration statement.” Id. at 2311 (citing Herman & MacLean v. 
Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 386 n.22 (1983)).  
 119. See id. at 230810. 
 120. Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 191 
(1994) (emphasis added). 
 121. See generally id. at 192.  
 122. Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 378 (1983). 
 123. Id. at 386 n.22.  
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is widely accepted that a mutual fund’s statements are the product of its 
investment advisers. Yet, despite such factual similarities, the Janus Court 
fails to distinguish the Herman & MacLean decision or expressly overrule 
it. 
Prior to Janus, several circuit courts had found primary liability for 
actors without “ultimate authority” over issued statements.124 For example, 
the Ninth Circuit had a “virtual ‘field day’ converting all that was secondary 
aiding and abetting liability at best in the Central Bank days into newfound 
‘primary’ liability.”125 The Tenth Circuit, in Anixter v. Home-Stake 
Production Co., found that an accountant was primarily liable when his 
knowingly fraudulent opinions were reproduced in prospectuses, 
registration statements, and annual reports, which were relied upon by 
investors.126 Anixter affirmed that secondary actors could be held liable 
under § 10(b) so long as they themselves made a material misstatement or 
omission, in addition to the other required elements for liability.127 In a later 
case decided after Stoneridge, the Tenth Circuit reaffirmed that a secondary 
actor, an accountant, could be primarily liable for having “made” false 
statements, where he drafted fraudulent SEC filings documents.128 The 
court reasoned that primary liability was appropriate because it was 
reasonable to conclude the accountant caused the firm to make the relevant 
statements, and was aware that these statements would reach investors.129 
The reasoning in these cases respects and fulfills the legislative purpose 
underlying § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.130 By allowing investors to sue the 
secondary actors who “made” the fraudulent statements, but did not have 
“ultimate authority,” the courts protected the defrauded investors and 
enabled them to recover their losses from those that knowingly participated 
in such fraud. 
The Janus dissent also highlights that the circuit courts have held that 
corporate officials may be liable for “making” fraudulent statements “where 
those officials use innocent persons as conduits through which the false 
                                                                                                                 
 124. See, e.g., SEC v. Wolfson, 539 F.3d 1249 (10th Cir. 2008); Anixter v. Home-Stake Prod. 
Co., 77 F.3d 1215 (10th Cir. 1996); McConville v. SEC, 465 F.3d 780 (7th Cir. 2006); In re 
Cabletron Systems, Inc., 311 F.3d 11 (1st Cir. 2002). 
 125. ROBERT J. HAFT, LIABILITY OF ATTORNEYS AND ACCOUNTANTS FOR SECURITIES 
TRANSACTIONS, SECURITIES LAW HANDBOOK SERIES § 3:9, at 3-41 (2003) (citing Adam v. 
Silicon Valley Bancshares, 884 F. Supp. 1398 (N.D. Cal. 1995); Employers Ins. of Wausau v. 
Musick, Peeler, & Garrett, 871 F. Supp. 381 (S.D. Cal. 1994); In re ZZZZ Best Sec. Litig., 864 F. 
Supp. 960 (C.D. Cal. 1994)). 
 126. Anixter, 77 F.3d at 1227.  
 127. Id. at 1226; HAFT, supra note 125, § 3:8, at 3-38 (“All courts that have considered 
[primary liability] after Central Bank have held that the unqualified audit opinion of an 
independent accountant constitutes the making of a statement by that accountant for the purposes 
of Rule 10b-5.”).  
 128. Wolfson, 539 F.3d at 1261. 
 129. Id.  
 130. “The purpose of [§ 10(b)] is protection of investors from fraudulent practices.” Id. at 1257 
(quoting SEC v. Int’l Chem. Dev. Corp., 469 F.2d 20, 26 (10th Cir. 1972)). 
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statements reach the public (without necessarily attributing the false 
statements to the officials).”131 In In re Cabletron Systems, Inc., a struggling 
firm provided false materials to analysts in order to lead them to believe the 
firm was doing better than it actually was.132 Based on the supplied 
fraudulent information, the market analysts published public statements that 
contained incorrect representations, which investors then relied upon.133 
The issue was whether the firm could be held liable for the analysts’ 
statements. The district court held that the firm was not liable because they 
did not “control” the analysts’ statements.134 
The First Circuit, however, reversed because “[a] test that required 
‘control’ would give company officials too much leeway to commit fraud 
on the market by using analysts as their mouthpieces.”135 Thus, despite the 
rationale and holding of Central Bank, the First Circuit determined that 
corporate officials could be primarily liable for statements made by third-
party analysts.136 To hold otherwise would have left the defrauded investors 
with no one to sue to remedy the economic harm suffered. Notably, analysts 
cannot satisfy the scienter requirement if they relied in good faith upon the 
information supplied by the corporate officials and did not intend to deceive 
anybody.137 
Just as in Cabletron, JIF’s board of trustees had no knowledge of the 
prospectuses’ false content and merely relied upon the prospectuses 
prepared by JCM when they were submitted to the public.138 JCM’s actions 
were precisely what the First Circuit was concerned with when deciding 
Cabletron, since JCM was able to commit fraud on the market by using JIF 
as “their mouthpiece.” The Janus Court consciously ignored the primary 
legislative purpose of § 10(b), refusing to protect the investing public. 
Given these well-reasoned holdings and, indeed, the Court’s own prior 
decisions, the result in Janus is confounding. The purpose of § 10(b) is 
                                                                                                                 
 131. Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2312 (2011) (Breyer 
J., dissenting) (citing In re Navarre Corp. Sec. Litig., 299 F.3d 735, 743 (8th Cir. 2002) (“The 
investors could also allege that the defendants used the analysts as a conduit, making false and 
misleading statements to securities analysts with the intent that the analysts communicate those 
statements to the market.”)). 
 132. In re Cabletron Systems, Inc., 311 F.3d 11, 2327 (1st Cir. 2002). 
 133. Id. at 38. 
 134. Id. at 37. 
 135. Id. at 38. 
 136. Id. 
 137. See Elizabeth A. Nowicki, A Response to Professor John Coffee: Analyst Liability Under 
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 72 U. CIN. L. REV. 1305, 1323 n.66 (2004) 
(“[I]f an analyst provided . . . an accurate summary of the information available to and known by 
him, yet the analyst made a recommendation in good faith based on diligently reached conclusions 
that proved in hindsight to be wrong, the analyst likely would not have liability concerns under 
Section 10(b).”). 
 138. Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2310 (2011) (Breyer 
J., dissenting) (“Here, it may well be that . . . [JIF’s] board of trustees knew nothing about the 
falsity of the prospectuses.”). 
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painfully clear. It “is a provision directed toward ensuring that when one 
speaks about a security, one speaks in a truthful, complete manner . . . 
regardless of the status of the speaker and his relationship (or lack thereof) 
to the listener.”139 The Janus Court tacitly ignores this interpretation by 
adopting a new “ultimate authority” test, which lacks any clear precedent to 
support such a departure. In the face of such a misguided holding that 
undermines the very purpose of the Exchange Act, Congress must expressly 
overrule Janus’ formalistic and unjust approach. 
III. AN ARGUMENT FOR LIABILITY WITHIN THE UNIQUE 
MUTUAL FUND CONTEXT 
A. DE FACTO CONTROL 
Even assuming arguendo that the Supreme Court was justified in its 
general caution to expanding Rule 10b-5, the Janus Court could have 
narrowly tailored its decision to allow mutual fund investors, as well as 
others similarly situated, to bring actions because of the distinct role an 
investment adviser plays when managing the mutual fund. 
Only one year prior to its Janus decision, the Supreme Court noted in 
Jones v. Harris Associates that it is “typical” for a fund adviser to “create 
the mutual fund,” “select the fund’s directors, manage the fund’s 
investments, and provide other services.”140 Thus, the Jones court 
recognized that “the advisory firm exercises de facto control of the 
[fund].”141 Furthermore, as the Second Circuit articulated, because of the 
widely recognized142 close nexus between a mutual fund and its investment 
adviser, “the fund often ‘cannot, as a practical matter sever its relationship 
with the adviser.’”143 
In Janus, JCM was responsible for JIF’s registration statements because 
it exhibited de facto control of the fund. Even when considering the strict 
bright-line requirement of “ultimate authority,” the Janus Court ignores 
such obvious industry standard characterizations of control here. Unlike the 
traditional secondary actors such as lawyers, accountants, and banks, JCM 
                                                                                                                 
 139. Nowicki, supra note 137, at 1314.  
 140. Jones v. Harris Assoc. L.P., 130 S. Ct. 1418, 1422 (2010) (finding that investment advisers 
have a fiduciary duty regarding fees to mutual fund investors and thus investors have a private 
right of action for breach of that duty); see Daily Income Fund, Inc. v. Fox, 464 U.S. 523, 534–38 
(1984) (noting the unusual proximity of managers to their mutual funds). 
 141. D. Bruce Johnsen, Myths About Mutual Fund Fees: Economic Insights on Jones v. Harris, 
35 J. CORP. L. 561, 579 (2010); see In re Steadman Sec. Corp., 46 SEC 896, 920 n.81 (1977) 
(“[T]he term ‘investment adviser’ is to some extent a misnomer” because “[t]he so-called 
‘adviser’ is no mere consultant. He is the fund’s manager. Hence the investment adviser almost 
always controls the fund.”). 
 142. See, e.g., Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Mgmt., 694 F.2d 923, 929–30 (2d Cir. 1982) 
(“Congress . . . recognized . . . the potentially incestuous relationships between many advisers and 
their funds . . . .”). 
 143. Jones, 130 S. Ct. at 1422 (quoting S. REP. NO. 91-184, at 5 (1969)). 
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was in charge of the day-to-day operations of the fund.144 “JCM’s legal 
department drafted the registration statements and JCM’s General Counsel 
was one of the persons ‘ultimately responsible’ for revisions and 
amendments to the registration statements.”145 Thus, it was not 
unreasonable nor against industry standard for the Fourth Circuit to 
conclude that JCM “participat[ed] in the writing and dissemination of the 
prospectuses . . . [and] made the misleading statements contained in the 
documents.”146 
B. ATTRIBUTION 
Even assuming JCM did not exhibit de facto control of the fund, there 
is ample evidence to suggest that the investing public could attribute the 
fraudulent statements to JCM. The Janus Court requires “attribution within 
a statement or implicit from surrounding circumstances [because it is] 
strong evidence that a statement was made by—and only by—the party to 
whom it is attributed.”147 Again, the Court compares this to a speechwriter, 
where despite who actually drafts the speech, it is the speaker who has 
control over what is ultimately said.148 
Yet, this analogy fails to adequately characterize the investment 
advisers’ role in relationship to the fund. While the fraudulent statements 
were never directly linked to JCM, surrounding circumstances provide a 
strong inference of attribution. First, as discussed in Part III.A above, it is 
widely held that mutual fund advisers have substantial control over their 
funds.149 In particular, advisers are solely responsible for the investment 
strategy of the funds, including research regarding which securities to buy 
and sell and portfolio management.150 Second, “[i]nvestors do not choose to 
invest in a fund because of the composition of the board; instead they invest 
with a particular investment advisor. After all it is the advisor’s name on the 
fund and not the board’s.”151 Because investors are aware that the advisers 
                                                                                                                 
 144. Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2312 (2011) (Breyer, 
J., dissenting).  
 145. Brief of John P. Freeman and James D. Cox as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent at 
7, Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296 (2011), (No. 09-525), 2010 
WL 4380233 at *14. 
 146. In re Mutual Funds Inv. Litig., 566 F.3d 111, 121 (4th Cir. 2009) (emphasis in original). 
 147. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2302. “The bright-line rule thus focuses the liability inquiry on the 
reliance element rather than on the conduct of the . . . actor.” David R. Allen, A New Breadth of 
Life for Private Rule 10b-5(b) Litigation After Stoneridge: SEC v. Tambone and Implied 
Statements by Collateral Actors, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 2093, 2107 (2011). 
 148. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2302.  
 149. See also supra Part I.D.2. 
 150. See Johnson, supra note 19, at 152; see also Jones v. Harris Assoc. L.P., 130 S. Ct. 1418, 
1422 (2010). 
 151. Johnson, supra note 19, at 154. For example, who advises the fund is so essential to 
investors that if the fund’s board fired the investment adviser, this would “nullify an essential 
reason many investors chose that fund.” Id.  
2012] Janus’ Limitation Under Rule 10b-5 721 
are responsible for the financial management of the fund and ultimately 
choose a particular mutual fund based upon the specific investment adviser, 
it is implicit that any financial statements produced by the fund would be 
reasonably attributable to the investment adviser. Thus, after re-
characterizing the Janus Court’s analogy to consider practical mutual fund 
circumstances, this would mean that an audience chooses to listen to a 
particular speech, not because of who the speaker was, but because of who 
drafted the speech. Such analogy necessarily fails when considering the 
practical implications of an investment adviser managing the day-to-day 
functions of the fund. 
C. PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL 
Because of the close relationship between fund and adviser in a mutual 
fund context and despite JCM properly observing corporate formalities, 
investors should be able to pierce the corporate veil and hold JCM primarily 
liable. The granting of the corporate charter to JCM was a “privilege that 
carries with it the responsibility to operate the corporation in accordance 
with the public interest.”152 Accordingly, it is appropriate to pierce the 
corporate veil, “whenever there is an ‘abuse’ of the corporate form, when 
the corporation is being operated in a manner that runs counter to the spirit 
of the grant of the privilege, and when, in short, the public weal is damaged, 
rather than enhanced by the operation of the corporation.”153 
As a general rule, two separate corporations are regarded as distinct 
legal entities and “absent fraud or bad faith, a corporation will not be held 
liable for the acts of its subsidiaries or other affiliated corporations.”154 
Thus, the law recognizes a strong presumption in favor of preserving 
limited liability and “disregarding the corporate form and imposing liability 
on affiliated corporate entities is an ‘extreme remedy, sparingly used.’”155 
In essence, the purpose of allowing a plaintiff to pierce the corporate veil is 
“to prevent an independent corporation from being used to defeat the ends 
of justice, to perpetrate fraud, to accomplish a crime, or otherwise to evade 
the law.”156 
Nevertheless, 
[i]n order to pierce the corporate veil or establish alter ego liability,157 it is 
generally necessary to show that a parent or affiliated entity158 exercised 
                                                                                                                 
 152. STEPHEN B. PRESSER, PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL § 1:2 (West 2011). 
 153. Id.  
 154. 1 WILLIAM M. FLETCHER, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS ch. 2 
§ 43 (Thompson Reuters 2012). 
 155. Douglas G. Smith, Piercing the Corporate Veil in Regulated Industries, 2008 B.Y.U. L 
REV. 1165, 1166, 1170 (2008) (citations omitted). 
 156. Dep’t. of Envtl. Prot. v. Ventron Corp., 468 A.2d 150, 164 (N.J. 1983). 
 157. “Under the alter ego doctrine, when a corporation is the mere instrumentality or business 
conduit of another corporation, the corporate form may be disregarded.” FLETCHER, supra note 
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domination or control over the entity at issue, that there was an element of 
fraud or abuse of the corporate form, and that the fraudulent abuse of the 
corporate form caused a tangible injury.159  
Domination or control is evidenced when, as a practical matter, the parent 
has “moved beyond the establishment of general policy and direction for 
the subsidiary and in effect [has] taken over the performance of the 
subsidiary’s day-to-day operations in carrying out that policy.”160 Similarly, 
the SEC defines “control” as “the power to direct or cause the direction of 
the management and policies of a person” by ownership, contract, or 
otherwise.161 
With this in mind, it is commonly acknowledged that in the mutual 
fund context, an investment adviser “dominates” and “controls” its 
managed funds.162 For example, the SEC has stated that “[a]n investment 
adviser typically organizes a mutual fund and is responsible for its day-to-
day operations,” and due to this extensive involvement, “investment 
advisers typically dominate the funds they advise.”163 Further, the Second 
Circuit has observed that “control of a mutual fund . . . lies largely in the 
hands of the investment adviser.”164 
The specific facts in Janus surpass the threshold requirement of 
domination and control to pierce the corporate veil. JCM not only managed 
the fund’s portfolio, but had virtually unrestrained control and discretion 
over the policies and day-to-day operations of JIF, including administrative, 
compliance, and accounting services.165 Notably, JCM was responsible for 
drafting and reviewing JIF prospectuses—the fund’s key marketing tool— 
                                                                                                                 
154, § 41.10. This theory applies when two legal distinct corporations are in such unity that it is 
difficult to separate them. See id.  
 158. “Alter ego liability is not limited to the parent-subsidiary corporate relationship; rather . . . 
liability can [also] be found between sister [or affiliated] companies.” Troyk v. Farmers Grp., Inc., 
90 Cal. Rptr. 3d 589, 619 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009) (finding that one sister subsidiary worked as an 
alter ego for another sister subsidiary, and thus, it was appropriate to pierce the corporate veil and 
hold the fraudulent subsidiary liable for the other’s actions). 
 159. Smith, supra note 155, at 1171 (emphasis and footnotes added).  
 160. Id. at 1173. Factors to consider when determining “domination” include: whether the 
corporations have observed proper corporate formalities, whether the subsidiary has been 
adequately capitalized, whether there has been a commingling of assets, and the overlap of 
officers and directors. While no factor is dispositive of alter ego liability by itself, they all must be 
considered within the totality of the circumstances in determining whether the parent has 
exercised “exclusive domination and . . . control to the point that [the subsidiary] no longer has 
legal or independent significance of [its] own.” Id. at 1172−78 (citing Outokumpu Eng’g Enters., 
Inc. v. Kvaerner Enviropower, Inc., 685 A.2d 724, 729 n.2 (Del. Super. Ct. 1996)) (alterations in 
original).  
 161. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.12b-2 (2008). 
 162. See John P. Freeman, Stewart L. Brown & Steve Pomerantz, Mutual Fund Advisory Fees: 
New Evidence and a Fair Fiduciary Duty Test, 61 OKLA. L. REV. 83, 84 (2008). 
 163. Role of Independent Directors of Investment Companies, 64 Fed. Reg. 112,59826, 
112,59827 (proposed Nov. 3, 1999) (emphasis added). 
 164. Tannenbaum v. Zeller, 552 F.2d 402, 405 (2d Cir. 1977) (emphasis added). 
 165. Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2312 (2011). 
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including language about “market timing.”166 The fund’s prospectuses’ 
were then disseminated through the parent company’s (JCG) website.167 
Finally, every single one of JIF’s seventeen officers was also a vice 
president at JCM.168 While the Janus majority properly recognized 
corporate formalities were observed,169 “[this factor alone] is not dispositive 
given that mere failure upon occasion to follow all the forms prescribed by 
law for the conduct of corporate activities will not justify disregard of the 
corporate [form].”170 
If the Janus Court had considered all of the evidence in totality, it 
should have determined, as is typically the case within the mutual fund 
industry, that JCM had significant control and dominion of JIF, satisfying a 
necessary requirement to disregard the corporate form. 
Through the control and dominion of JIF, JCM used the fund to 
perpetrate a fraud and misused the corporate form.171 As noted earlier, JCM 
drafted JIF’s prospectuses, which included language expressing that 
“market timing” activities would not occur within JIF.172 Although not 
illegal, one can surmise that the purpose of this prospectus language was to 
assure the public that these market-timing practices, which dilute the value 
of shares held by long-term mutual fund investors, were not occurring. This 
made the fund more attractive to investors, increasing JCM’s profit.173 
Despite specifically drafting such language, the fund still engaged in a 
market-timing scheme.174 It is undisputed that this constituted a fraudulent 
misrepresentation.175 Yet, even though JCM handled the actual management 
practices of the fund, including the market-timing scheme, and because the 
                                                                                                                 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. 
 169. The Janus majority specifically recognized that JIF’s board of trustees was more 
independent than 15 U.S.C. § 80a-10 requires. Id. at 2304. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-10 states “[n]o 
registered investment company shall have a board of directors more than 60 per centum of the 
members of which are persons who are interested persons of such registered company.” 15 U.S.C. 
§ 80a-10(a) (2006). 
 170. Smith, supra note 155, at 1173 (internal quotations and citations omitted). “In assessing 
whether to pierce the corporate veil, courts generally apply a range of factors, none of which by 
itself is sufficient to establish liability.” Id. at 1171.  
 171. Id. at 1181 (internal citations and quotations omitted) (noting that “parties seeking to 
establish [alter ego] liability must show that the parent is employing the subsidiary to perpetrate a 
fraud or commit wrongdoing” and that “merely showing control is insufficient to overcome the 
presumption that corporate entities are separate”).  
 172. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.  
 173. GRAY ET AL., supra note 14, at 135. The investment adviser “can generate a greater fee by 
either growing the fund’s assets through successful investing or by attracting new investors 
through promotion.” Johnson, supra note 19, at 155.  
 174. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2300.  
 175. In 2004, JCM agreed to pay $50 million in civil penalties and $50 million in disgorgement 
and settled its case with the Attorney General of New York for its market timing activities. Id. at 
2300 n.2.  
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prospectus was technically issued by JIF, JCM effectively shielded itself 
from any liability via the corporate form. 
Nonetheless, the Janus Court refused to disregard the corporate form.176 
In the majority’s opinion, “the Court made no attempt to support its reason 
for not piercing the veil, nor did it suggest that the unique relationship of a 
mutual fund with its advisor may involve other considerations than whether 
corporate formalities were observed.”177 By strictly adhering to the 
corporate form, the Janus Court strengthened JCM’s corporate shield and 
essentially endorsed a blueprint for widespread securities fraud to occur 
under the guise of corporate law. 
The Janus Court’s refusal to grant recourse against JCM operates as a 
grave inequity and is in contrast to the legislative intent of § 10(b). The 
Supreme Court has stated that § 10(b) should be “construed not technically 
and restrictively, but flexibly to effectuate its remedial purposes,” one of 
which is victim compensation.178 Private rights of action “afford victims of 
fraud the best and often only hope of recovering their losses, something for 
which government enforcement actions are ill-equipped.”179 If investors are 
unable to reach JCM, then by default, JIF is the only entity left to cover any 
remedies. But if “the [investors] were to recover their losses from JIF, the 
result would be that the public investors in a mutual fund would be paying 
damages to the public investors in the fund’s investment advisor.”180 In 
other words, entirely innocent public investors of JIF would be forced to 
pay JCG’s investors. Such a result would be grossly inequitable considering 
JIF was a “mere shell” that held no other assets other than those it held for 
shareholders.181 Thus, refusal to disregard the corporate form effectively 
leaves investors with no means of recovery. 
Further, if JIF’s board was deliberately deceived by JCM, then JIF 
lacks the requisite scienter requirement for Rule 10b-5, and investors would 
have no one to hold liable.182 “There is serious suggestion that [JIF’s] board 
knew little or nothing about the falsity of what was said.”183 The Janus 
dissent poses the question, “[w]hat is to happen when guilty management 
writes a prospectus (for the board) containing materially false statements 
                                                                                                                 
 176. Id. at 2304.  
 177. Poser, supra note 72, at 207.  
 178. SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 819–21 (2002). 
 179. Brief of AARP and North American Securities Administrators Association, Inc. as Amici 
Curiae in Support of Respondents at 7, Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. 
Ct. 2296 (2011) (No. 09-525), 2010 WL 4339893 at *8. 
 180. Poser, supra note 72, at 209.  
 181. See id. (“Such a result defies common sense and can hardly be justified on any basis.”); see 
also Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2312 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“The Fund has no assets separate and apart 
from those they hold for shareholders.”).  
 182. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 194 n.12 (1976) (outlining the scienter 
requirement). 
 183. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2312 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  
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and fools both board and public into believing they are true?”184 According 
to the Janus holding, no one has “made” the materially false statement in 
this scenario because by merely observing corporate formalities, only JIF’s 
board had “ultimate authority.”185 Consequently, if no one has “made” the 
materially false statement, then no one can be liable to defrauded investors. 
In order to further § 10(b)’s tenet of victim recompense, the Court should 
have recognized that JIF was an alter ego identity of JCM. Considering that 
JCM had unrestrained dominion of JIF’s day-to-day activities, had 
perpetrated a fraud, and was using the corporate form as a liability shield, 
allowing investors to pierce the corporate veil and bring a private right of 
action against JCM would have been consistent with the intent of § 10(b). 
IV. A PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION PROMOTES MARKET 
EFFICIENCY AND RESTORES INVESTOR CONFIDENCE 
Economic theory suggests that expressly granting investors a private 
right of action against investment advisors in the mutual fund context will 
promote market efficiency, furthering the legislative intent of § 10(b).186 
The Supreme Court has recognized, “[t]he magnitude of the federal interest 
in protecting the integrity and efficient operation of the market for 
nationally traded securities cannot be overstated.”187 In an efficient capital 
market, economic growth is fueled because of two significant occurrences: 
(1) investors are confident, on average, they will earn a fair rate of return; 
and (2) “entrepreneurs, small businesses, and corporations are able to obtain 
necessary capital at the lowest possible cost.”188 Thus, market integrity is 
ensured.189 Nevertheless, when investors feel that they “cannot rely upon 
the accuracy and completeness of issuer statements, they will be less likely 
to invest [capital], thereby reducing the liquidity of the securities markets to 
                                                                                                                 
 184. Id. at 2310 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  
 185. If JIF’s board was unaware that the prospectuses were false and misleading, they lacked 
the scienter necessary to make them primarily liable. See id. 
 186. Congress’ aim in enacting the Exchange Act was not confined solely to compensating 
defrauded investors. Congress also intended to ensure honest markets for securities and to 
promote investor confidence. S. REP. NO. 73-792, at 3–5 (1934). 
 187. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 78 (2006); see Bernard 
S. Black, The Legal and Institutional Preconditions for Strong Securities Markets, 48 UCLA L. 
REV. 781, 781 (2001) (“[In the U.S. securities market,] [i]nvestors pay enormous amounts of 
money to strangers for completely intangible rights, whose value depends entirely on the quality 
of the information that the investors receive and on the sellers’ honesty.”). 
 188. Mark Klock, What Will it Take to Label Participation in a Deceptive Scheme to Defraud 
Buyers of Securities a Violation of Section 10(b)? The Disastrous Result and Reasoning of 
Stoneridge, 58 U. KAN. L. REV. 309, 350 (2010). 
 189. “‘Market integrity’ is used here to refer to the maintenance of a set of broadly-accepted 
rules and norms that support the effective and efficient functioning of a free marketplace within a 
capitalistic framework.” Steven R. Salbu, The Misappropriation Theory of Insider Trading: A 
Legal, Economic, and Ethical Analysis, 15 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 223, 241 n.105 (1992). 
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the detriment of investors and issuers alike.”190 Further, if investors feel 
their expected returns are unfair, they will pull out their capital.191 This 
“flight of capital results in diminished business investment, fewer jobs, less 
tax revenue to fund government programs, and more economic hardship.”192 
Once the integrity of the market fails, economic efficiency fails with it.193 
By failing to hold the fraudulent investment advisers (JCM) liable, the 
Janus Court perpetuates moral hazard within the mutual fund industry, 
hurting market efficiency. “Moral hazard exists when people are 
encouraged to engage in undesirable behavior because they are insulated 
from its consequences.”194 In the financial markets context, if investment 
advisers are “always given the benefit of the doubt when they engage in 
questionable activities which are not clearly illegal, then financial market 
participants are effectively being encouraged with economic incentives to 
engage in shady conduct.”195 In Janus, JCM was dishonest to the investing 
public in an effort to increase its overall profit. When that misrepresentation 
became public knowledge, investors quickly removed its capital from JIF, 
which was detrimental to the shareholders of JCG.196 Yet, the Janus Court 
refused to allow the defrauded investors to recover its losses from the 
origins of the fraud, JCM.197 Janus suggests, in the mutual fund context, 
investment advisers can risk drafting fraudulent fund prospectuses in hopes 
of larger profits because they are now insulated from any liabilities by mere 
observance of corporate formalities. Without a private right of action to 
threaten significant monetary damages, there are fewer disincentives for 
investment advisers to reduce avoidable risks created by their decisions. 
Thus, “unethical conduct that is profitable will be widespread.”198 
The presence of moral hazard inevitably results in market 
inefficiency.199 Shielding the mutual fund advisers from private right of 
                                                                                                                 
 190. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 235 n.12 (1988) (citing In re Carnation Co., 
Exchange Act Release No. 22214, 33 SEC Docket 1025, 1030 (1985)). 
 191. Klock, supra note 188, at 350–51.  
 192. Id. 
 193. “Systemic unfairness in the availability of information within securities markets reduces 
investor confidence, thereby discouraging participation in and undermining vital capital markets.” 
Salbu, supra note 189, at 241 n.105. 
 194. Klock, supra note 188, at 341. Unfortunately, our financial markets are no stranger to 
moral hazard. When Congress bailed out Bear Stearns because it was “too big to fail,” this 
generated moral hazard because the managers of the large banks believed they could take 
excessive risk, yet still be insulated from bankruptcy. Alison M. Hashmall, After the Fall: A New 
Framework to Regulate “Too Big To Fail” Non-Bank Financial Institutions, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
829, 841 n.51 (2010). 
 195. Klock, supra note 188, at 341.  
 196. Janus Capital Grp. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2300 (2011). 
 197. Id. at 2305. 
 198. Klock, supra note 188, at 340.  
 199. See id. at 343 (“If Scientific-Atlanta and Motorola were held liable for their actions, the 
moral hazard problem and the resulting economic inefficiency would vanish.”). 
2012] Janus’ Limitation Under Rule 10b-5 727 
actions chills the mutual fund markets.200 The Supreme Court has noted 
“[i]nvestors likely would hesitate to venture their capital in a market where 
trading based on misappropriated nonpublic information is unchecked by 
law.”201 Investors will not know which mutual fund advisers are honest and 
which are willing to take excessive risk to earn a larger profit for 
themselves, as JCM did.202 As a result, investors will indiscriminately 
discount all of the mutual funds’ share prices.203 This result hurts honest 
mutual fund advisers who are unable to receive a fair price for its shares, 
which incentivizes them to either begin risky conduct themselves or leave 
the market altogether.204 With the average quality of honest mutual fund 
advisers significantly lowered, “[i]nvestors rationally react by further 
discounting share prices.”205 Unsurprisingly, even more honest advisers are 
then driven from the market.206 This deathward spiral towards market 
inefficiency is precisely why Congress intended § 10(b) to provide for 
strong investor protection. The availability of a private right of action to 
investors is a simple solution to deter dishonest behavior and avoid a 
mutual fund market collapse.207 
Janus’ suggestion that SEC enforcement, by itself, is sufficient to deter 
dishonest conduct and promote market efficiency is faulty.208 Congress has 
stated that “private lawsuits promote public and global confidence in our 
capital markets and help to deter wrongdoing and to guarantee that 
corporate officers, auditors, directors, lawyers and others properly perform 
their jobs.”209 Further, the Supreme Court has “long recognized that 
meritorious private actions to enforce federal antifraud securities laws are 
                                                                                                                 
 200. See Black, supra note 187, at 781. 
 201. United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 658 (1997). 
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 209. Maynard, supra note 202, at 574−75 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 104-269, at 31 (1995)).  
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an essential supplement to criminal prosecutions and civil enforcement 
actions brought . . . by the [SEC].”210 Additionally, the SEC has stated, 
[O]ur resources are inadequate to police all securities law violations which 
may take place. As a result, our enforcement activities are designed not 
only to address specific wrongdoings, but also to alert the private sector as 
to the kinds of activities which we believe violate the securities laws. 
Private actions . . . supplement the Commission’s own enforcement 
program, and significantly increase the likelihood that securities law 
violations will be challenged and corrected.211 
Furthermore, though “the securities market is growing at a rapid rate, 
the SEC’s budget has remained fairly constant, meaning that the SEC is 
essentially being asked to regulate more firms with the same financial 
resources.”212 Even if the SEC’s funding and staff were substantially 
increased, there are still situations “in which the SEC is unable to recover 
anything for investors, leaving class action litigation as the only way 
injured investors can recover anything.”213 Thus, private rights of action are 
a necessary supplement because the SEC’s finite amount of resources limits 
its ability to investigate and prosecute all securities violations.214 
CONCLUSION 
In response to the Janus Court’s erroneous, categorical limitation on 
civil liability, Congress must expressly provide a private right of action for 
investors defrauded in the unique mutual fund context. Despite the advisers 
being separate legal entities from the mutual funds, primary liability should 
be granted here because of the advisers’ de facto control of the funds.215 
Without an express congressional provision, advisers will continue to be 
shielded from liability for fraudulent practices by merely adhering to the 
corporate form. This lack of accountability creates a moral hazard problem 
in the mutual fund industry. When motivation for risky behavior increases, 
it is not long before economic inefficiency follows. A strong private right of 
action, widely held to be a necessary supplement to the SEC, can deter the 
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2012] Janus’ Limitation Under Rule 10b-5 729 
prevalence of moral hazard and protect the economic efficiency so vital to 
our capital markets.216 Nearly one-fifth of American households have 
invested over $11 trillion in our mutual funds.217 With those numbers only 
expected to grow, our already struggling economy cannot afford any market 
inefficiency, let alone a collapse of the mutual fund industry. Thus, now 
more than any other time, it is essential that Congress assure market 
confidence by stepping up and correcting the Janus decision. 
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